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RECONSIDERING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTORS: 
TRADING “COMPLIANCE BY COMPUTER” FOR 
RELATIONSHIP BUILDING 
 
MICHELLE C. PAUTZ 
University of Dayton 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Demands for government accountability extend into all the aspects of 
government service and the environmental realm is no different.  
Environmental inspectors - the front-line workers in environmental 
protection agencies – are among the many civil servants who face 
demands for accountability.  Unfortunately, although accountability is 
desirable normatively speaking, in practice it is not so simple.  
Accountability for environmental inspectors frequently involves 
measures such as the number of inspections completed, the efficiency 
of data entry in agency databases, and the turnaround time on 
inspection reports.  Such measures leave environmental inspectors, who 
ideally want - and practically need - to be in the field, stuck in the 
office ensuring “compliance by computer;” extensive interviews with 
environmental inspectors in Virginia and Ohio substantiate these 
assertions.  Yet inspectors desire (along with their supervisors) positive 
and cooperative relationships with the regulated community.  
Overwhelming majorities of inspectors in Virginia and Ohio see good 
relationships as necessary for the success of environmental regulation.  
The sentiments of inspectors are echoed in much of the accountability 
literature that questions the tendency to embrace various performance 
measures over the importance of dialogue and an emphasis on 
discretion.  This paper argues that “compliance by computer” is 
detrimental to the existing environmental regulatory system and 
maintains that accountability should be sought by building positive 
relationships between inspectors and the regulated community. 
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 Discussions of accountability have permeated the 
field of public administration for some time and seem to 
occupy our collective conscious when it comes to 
evaluating the performance of civil servants and agencies 
alike.  Of particular importance in this conversation is the 
role of street-level bureaucrats, or front-line workers.  
Although these crucial civil servants are increasingly 
considered – particularly with regards to accountability (c.f. 
Hupe and Hill 2007; Pollitt 2003; Day and Klein 1987) – 
key segments of the front-line worker population continue 
to be neglected.  Most specifically, front-line workers in the 
environmental policy arena play a significant, yet routinely 
overlooked, role in protecting and ensuring the quality of 
the natural environment (there are a few exceptions, 
however, c.f. Scheberle 2004; Pautz 2009).  Environmental 
inspectors are those civil servants who work predominantly 
at the state level and interact with the regulated community 
to ensure compliance with environmental laws.  As with all 
categories of civil servants, it is suspected that 
environmental inspectors face competing definitions of 
accountability that can adversely impact performance and 
achievement of policy goals.  Perhaps one of the most 
important ways to gain insight about the types of 
accountability these front-line regulators encounter is to ask 
the regulators themselves.   
 Environmental inspectors in Virginia and Ohio were 
interviewed to determine their perceptions on interacting 
with the regulated community and how accountability is 
manifested.  The results of 34 interviews and subsequent 
qualitative data analysis provide initial insights into the 
types of accountability these inspectors would prefer and 
demonstrate that “compliance by computer” occurs from a 
seemingly overreliance on output rather than outcome 
measures.  Inspectors in this study would prefer to be in the 
field interacting with the regulated community and building 
relationships with them to achieve the best possible 
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environmental outcomes.  Instead, the inherent tensions of 
pursuing conflicting views of accountability appear to leave 
these inspectors stuck in the office processing paperwork 
rather than working with their counterparts in the regulated 
community to achieve environmental goals.  Understanding 
inspectors‟ views on accountability are particularly relevant 
in the environmental policy arena as more alternative 
policy tools are being embraced that embody fewer 
attributes of traditional command and control policies. 
 To investigate the perceptions of inspectors and 
their work, this exploratory research begins by 
contextualizing the interviews with a brief look at 
conceptualizations of accountability and their applicability 
to the work of regulators.  Then the discussion shifts to a 
more focused consideration of environmental inspectors 
themselves and why conversations with inspectors directly 
are long overdue.  With this background, the findings from 
the nearly three dozen interviews are examined before the 
paper concludes with a look at the implications of shifting 
from bureaucratic to professional accountability for 
environmental inspectors. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 Before exploring the remarks of nearly three dozen 
environmental inspectors, first we must examine 
accountability in the context of these front-line regulators.  
Accountability, despite its ubiquity in public administration 
(c.f. Frederickson 2007), does not have a standard, widely 
accepted definition (c.f. Koppell 2005).  Romzek (2000) 
defines accountability as the process of holding someone 
answerable for performance.  There is extensive discussion 
regarding the dimensions and types of accountability (c.f. 
Romzek & Dubnick 1987; Romzek 2000; Behn 2001; 
Gormley & Balla 2004; Koppell 2005) and Frederickson 
(2007), among others, notes the dominance of 
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accountability discussions in public administration and how 
much of those discussions focus on accountability as “little 
more than measures of organizational performance” (11).  
Without delving into the intricacies of the debate swirling 
around accountability‟s definition, recall Romzek and 
Dubnick‟s (1987) four types of accountability:  legal, 
bureaucratic, professional, and political.  This typology is 
devised based on the source of agency control (internal or 
external) and the degree of control over agency actions 
(high or low).  
Accountability is particularly important in the work 
of the civil service since government is instituted to serve 
the public interest.  Although academic discussions struggle 
to define public interest, the public interest is both “a verbal 
symbol [and] an institutional force” (Goodsell 1990, 107).  
Goodsell (1990) argues that civil servants are the leading 
embodiment and proponent of the public interest.  Such 
sentiments are echoed in discussions of the roles of public 
administrators and to whom they are answerable (c.f. 
Denhardt and Denhardt 2003; Behn 2001; Hamilton 2007).   
More specifically, accountability concerns are 
pronounced in the regulatory state because of fears of 
regulatory capture by the regulated community and, 
therefore, a disregard for the public interest.  Capture 
theory or economic regulatory theory, maintains that 
regulatory action (or inaction) is dictated by individuals 
pursuing their own interests (c.f. Stigler 1971; Peltzman 
1976).  The interests of regulatory actors are diverse and 
their actions may be guided by a plethora of motives.  For 
instance, decision making may be dictated by monetary 
considerations, job retention or future employment 
aspirations (e.g. the “revolving door” effect), self-
gratification, or the desire for tranquility between entities 
(Gormley 1979; Levine & Forrence 1990; Laffont & Tirole 
1991).  In the case of environmental inspectors, the 
longstanding sentiment is that inspectors have a great deal 
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of discretion in their job duties leaving them susceptible to 
undue influence that does not serve the public.  
Accordingly, to mitigate capture fears, inspectors are held 
accountable through various mechanisms.  This mention of 
capture theory is made because it helps to understand why 
accountability concerns are so pronounced in the regulatory 
arena despite a sizable and growing chorus of literature that 
refutes capture theory of regulation and posits a more 
positive view of civil servants and regulatory agencies (c.f. 
Croley 2008; Joskow & Noll 1981; Viscusi, Vernon, & 
Harrington 2005).  Indeed, Pautz (2009) argues positive, 
trusting relationships are vital between inspectors and the 
regulated community for better environmental outcomes. 
Despite the prominence of accountability in public 
administration and governance discussions and long-
standing concerns of regulatory capture of civil servants, 
one might expect an extensive discussion of accountability 
in the regulatory state.  More specifically, since front-line 
regulators play an integral role in the implementation and 
monitoring of regulations and utilize discretion in those 
responsibilities, discussions of accountability are 
undoubtedly important.  However, such a discussion is 
largely absent.  Scott (2000) notes that accountability is a 
multilevel concept in the regulatory state and Lodge (2004) 
expands this discussion to consider how to make 
accountability improvements.  Accordingly, it is of little 
surprise that front-line workers, despite their significance in 
the regulatory state, are generally ignored in these 
discussions of regulation and accountability since this 
population of actors is frequently omitted (c.f. Lipsky 1980; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, among others). 
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
INSPECTORS 
 
Environmental inspectors experience daily the 
demands of accountability in their work interacting with the 
regulated community.  In most environmental protection 
agencies, inspectors specialize in a particular 
environmental media (or area), such as air, water, or waste.  
An individual inspector is responsible for an array of 
facilities that hold a permit to operate and emit specified 
levels of pollution.  The actual number of facilities an 
inspector is responsible for can range from 20 or 30 to 
several hundred, depending on the type of facility and why 
it is regulated (Pautz 2009).  These facilities are generally 
scattered over a given geographic area and the types of 
operations can vary dramatically.  For example, an 
inspector may be responsible for inspecting facilities that 
range from a cigarette producing plant to a metal scrap yard 
to a dry cleaner.  Thus, the inspector must be conversant 
with the operations and pollution abatement technologies 
for a wide array of often unrelated facilities.   
 The central component of an inspector‟s job 
responsibilities is the physical site inspection of a facility to 
determine compliance with environmental regulations.  “As 
the word „inspector‟ suggests, routine inspections and 
check visits are the „traditional‟ methods of operation for 
many regulatory officials and ones which are regarded as 
fundamental by field staff” (Hutter 1997, 107). In addition 
to the physical site inspections, the inspector has a variety 
of other duties, including extensive recordkeeping and 
complaints investigation.   
 This discussion has explored the roles of 
environmental inspectors under the traditional command 
and control regulatory regime.  Although this approach to 
environmental protection continues to be the dominant 
model, movement towards the “next-generation” of 
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environmental policies appears to be underway in some 
areas (c.f. Durant, Fiorino, and O‟Leary 2004; Eisner 2006; 
Fiorino 2006).  In comparison to command and control 
regulations, next-generation policies are cooperative not 
confrontational, comprehensive rather than fragmented, and 
flexible instead of rigid (Chertow and Esty 1997, 4).  These 
policies require regulators and the regulated community to 
work together to devise courses of action to achieve 
prescribed outcomes.  Accordingly, next-generation 
policies, which will be explored more extensively in a 
subsequent section, are less prescriptive and require greater 
flexibility – thus, they are dependent on inspectors 
exercising greater discretion.  As such, accountability 
becomes even more of a concern. 
This brief review of inspectors‟ primary duties 
highlights the significant role they play in environmental 
regulation.  Accordingly, one might expect that they are 
afforded considerable attention, but inspectors are typically 
granted only passing acknowledgments. Bardach and 
Kagan (1982/2002), for example, discuss environmental 
inspectors as part of their larger examination of “regulatory 
unreasonableness” in the United States.  In the lone chapter 
devoted to inspectors, they address the characteristics of 
“good inspectors” by drawing parallels with the literature 
on “good cops.”  According to Bardach and Kagan, an 
inspector should be adept at resolving disputes and other 
problems while endeavoring to keep disagreements and 
difficulties from turning into adversarial relationships; 
inspectors should have sufficient knowledge and 
understanding of technical issues.   
Then again, perhaps it is not surprising that these 
front-line workers are frequently overlooked.  Hummel 
(1991) and Schmidt (1993), among others, have discussed 
the tendency to neglect the value that local knowledge 
brings to discussions of policy formation and 
implementation.  Pautz and Schnitzer (2008) call attention 
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to overlooked populations in environmental policymaking, 
notably inspectors and publics, but do not connect their 
roles with accountability.   
May (2007), however, is an exception when he 
applies Romzek and Dubnick‟s (1987) typology of 
accountability to regulatory regimes and the actions of 
regulators.  In particular, he focuses on two of the four 
types of accountability directly related to the work of 
regulators:  bureaucratic and professional accountability.  
Bureaucratic accountability refers to accountability 
structures that foster supervisory control over a range of 
agency actions (Romzek and Dubnick 228).  More 
specifically, close supervision and detailed standard 
operating procedures are essential to ensure that orders are 
followed.  May takes Romzek and Dubnick‟s description 
one step further in its application to the work of regulators 
and notes that regulators‟ discretion is curtailed through the 
use of checklists and other bureaucratic controls that “limit 
discretion of inspectors and guide their actions” (May 12).   
Applied to front-line environmental regulators, bureaucratic 
accountability is observable in the use of detailed checklists 
for inspections, prescribed standard operating procedures 
for conducting on-site sampling and inspections, as well as 
set procedures for reviewing reports from regulated entities, 
and enormous amounts of paperwork to ensure that a 
satisfactory paper trail exists for compliance 
determinations.  These accountability mechanisms coincide 
well with the traditional, command and control approach to 
environmental regulations.  Emphasis is placed on 
standardization of methods and numerous reporting 
requirements. 
Professional accountability, by contrast, is 
characterized by deference to professional expertise and 
flexibility in decision making and actions because of the 
complex nature of the issues (Romzek and Dubnick 229).  
May (2007) picks up on the importance of regulators‟ 
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discretion, as governed by professional knowledge and 
experience, in achieving desired regulatory outcomes.  
Instead of focusing on specific and stringent procedures 
and measures, regulators instead exercise professional 
judgment to achieve desired results (May 12).  For 
environmental inspectors, professional accountability 
would be manifested in a fundamentally different way than 
bureaucratic accountability since the former recognizes the 
professional expertise of the inspectors and therefore 
affords inspectors deference in their actions.  More 
specifically, professional accountability may be observable 
through less rigid checklists and procedures for inspectors 
to follow in the field in exchange for general guidance and 
more flexibility for the inspectors to work with the 
regulated community to achieve environmental outcomes in 
a cooperative manner while adhering to the dictates of 
existing environmental regulations.  Here inspectors would 
be given more flexibility in pursuing outcomes with less 
rigidity in the process.  Professional accountability tends to 
coincide with next generation environmental policies that 
tend to provide more general guidance and less specific 
provisions to achieve environmental outcomes (a more 
thorough discussion of next generation policies follows in a 
subsequent section).
1
 
 While bureaucratic accountability seems to be the 
norm in the regulatory state in keeping with command and 
control approaches, professional accountability appears to 
be the desired form of accountability among regulatory 
theorists (May 2007).  Sparrow (2000) and Bardach and 
Kagan (1982/2002) argue that professional accountability is 
the best method of achieving desired regulatory outcomes 
and protecting against regulatory abuse and capture.  
Regulators should be able to adapt a “pragmatic approach” 
                                                 
1 Although this is not to say that professional accountability could not find a 
place under the traditional, command and control regulatory structure of 
existing environmental regulations.  An example of this application follows. 
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to dealing with the regulated community since a „one-size 
fits all‟ approach is not feasible (Sparrow 2000; May 2007).  
Regulators need the flexibility to deal with firms as the 
situation warrants, as guided by their professional expertise 
and judgment to achieve desired outcomes for the public, 
and rigid procedures and policies stymie such efforts.  The 
results of stringent controls on regulators are often less 
desirable policy outcomes.   
Consider the following example that demonstrates 
different types of accountability and illustrates the potential 
importance of professional accountability.  A solid waste 
inspector is visiting one of the landfills she is responsible 
for overseeing after a significant period of rain in the 
region.  After a turbulent compliance history since the 
landfill began operation, this inspector was newly assigned 
to the site and became determined to bring this landfill into 
compliance and keep it in compliance.  She and the staff at 
the landfill worked together for the first year or so going 
through many issues and gaining the trust of one another.  
In the process, the landfill was more and more forthcoming 
about some of the challenges it was facing in compliance 
and she was able to help them devise solutions to solve 
myriad problems.  For the last few years, this particular 
landfill has been in compliance, even with the pesky 
paperwork requirements that baffle most.  A major issue 
with landfills is erosion for understandable reasons.  Upon 
arrival at the landfill, the inspector noticed some significant 
areas of erosion that would indicate the facility is out of 
compliance.  Instead of automatically citing the landfill for 
its erosion problems – unquestionably due to the 
unseasonable and significant rains the region just 
experienced – the inspector, exercising professional 
judgment, points out the problems to the landfill operators 
(which they are already well aware) and tells them to take 
corrective measures and she will be back in a week to 
follow up.  Here, the dictates of bureaucratic accountability 
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and its rigid procedures would dictate a citation; however, 
professional accountability allowed the inspector to 
recognize that the landfill is abiding by the rules but is 
coping with weather patterns beyond its control and is 
temporarily out of compliance.  Instead of being 
unreasonable, the inspector, with her years of experience 
with the landfill, decided the best course of action was to 
utilize her discretion and allow the facility to come into 
compliance on its own instead of jumping to an adversarial 
posture that would have unknown and incalculable 
repercussions.
2
   
Although one type of accountability appears to be 
favored among regulatory scholars (c.f. Sparrow 2000; 
Bardach and Kagan 1982/2002; May 2007), one could 
reasonably surmise that multiple views on accountability 
exist in regulatory agencies.  Yet, these multiple 
perspectives on accountability can make public agencies 
and their civil servants “mad” as the different approaches 
are often in tension with one another (Koppell 2005).  
These competing types of accountability can often lead to 
poor performance since different forms of accountability 
may be in conflict with one another (Romzek and Dubnick 
1987; Behn 2001; Koppell 2005).
3
  The preceding 
discussion gives rise to a number of questions, including:  
what are the types of accountability being pursued in the 
environmental regulatory system; and, perhaps more 
importantly, what type of accountability should be 
pursued? 
There are no easy answers to the aforementioned 
questions.  Perhaps as a starting point since accountability 
                                                 
2 This example demonstrates that professional accountability could find a place 
in the traditional environmental regulatory structure, not just with next 
generation environmental policies. 
3 Furthermore, as Dubnick (2005) reminds us, the assumption is routinely made 
that there is a positive relationship between accountability and performance, yet 
that assumption is frequently untested and may indeed be false. 
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is being demanded of inspectors, both because of the 
general trend toward increasing accountability in a 
democratic society and because of persistent fears of 
regulatory capture, we should consider inspectors‟ own 
views of their jobs and their work with the regulated 
community.  More specifically, much of the concern 
regarding accountability stems from the interactions 
inspectors have with the regulated community; therefore, 
we should focus our investigation on these interactions.  As 
previously discussed, it is important not to overlook the 
experiences of those on the ground level, even though the 
propensity is to focus elsewhere (c.f. Hummel 1991; 
Schmidt 1993).  Furthermore, Hedge, Menzel, and 
Williams (1988) note that regulators‟ perceptions impact 
how they do their jobs.  In particular, by investigating 
inspectors‟ desires and challenges in regulatory 
interactions, we can better assess the accountability 
mechanisms they face in their day-to-day responsibilities.  
These insights may enable us to determine whether 
bureaucratic accountability or professional accountability is 
emphasized.  If we can discern which accountability 
mechanisms seem to be stressed, we can then begin an 
important discussion about what might be most appropriate 
in the environmental regulatory state and what changes 
should come in the future. 
 
INSPECTORS AND THEIR VIEWS 
 
Before outlining the parameters of this exploratory 
study, it is worth noting the significance of states in 
environmental policy and why state regulators were 
selected instead of federal regulators.  Lowry (1992) 
succinctly states:  “[s]tates matter.  Policies are not simply 
created by national officials and then routinely 
implemented by state and local governments as if they were 
unquestioning automatons in some Weberian machine” (3-
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4).  Since states have been granted more and more authority 
for meeting federal environmental standards, their 
responsibilities have grown.  “Consequently, the 
operational responsibility for most of EPA‟s major 
programs currently lies with the states, and EPA routinely 
relies on states to implement the full range of 
environmental responsibilities associated with these 
programs, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act" (GAO 2002, 4).  These broad authorizations have 
given the states “considerable latitude” in environmental 
regulation (Sigman 2003, 108).    
Several indicators depict the scope of state 
involvement in environmental regulation.  The 
Environmental Council of States (ECOS) reports, for 
example, that the states regulated over 1.75 million sites in 
1999, inspected those sites more than 500,000 times and 
made over 449,000 additional compliance evaluations in 
the same year (ECOS 2001).
4
  According to Rabe (2006), 
the states  
 
collectively issue more than 90 percent of all 
environmental permits, complete more than 75 
percent of all environmental enforcement actions, 
and rely on the federal government for less than 
25 percent of their total funding on environmental 
and natural resource concerns (35-36).   
 
Thus, “[i]t is no exaggeration to conclude that policy 
depends on the capacity and willingness of individual states 
to implement federal policy” (Eisner 2006, 36). 
 In keeping with the significance of states in 
environmental protection, two states, Virginia and Ohio, 
were selected to begin exploring the perceptions and 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, more recent data are not available from the ECOS on 
the numbers of regulated facilities and inspections conducted by the 
states. 
376  PAQ FALL 2011 
 
approaches of front-line regulators in environmental 
protection.  Both states were selected chiefly for ease of 
access since face-to-face interviews were sought as the 
primary means of data collection.  Virginia and Ohio are 
among the middle range and majority of states in its 
commitment to and capacity for environmental protection 
(O‟Leary and Yandle, 2000; Rabe 2006; Wingfield and 
Marcus 2007).
5
  Therefore, both states should allow for 
insights into an average state environmental protection 
agency. 
Interviews with 34 state level environmental 
inspectors were conducted in Ohio and Virginia.  The semi-
structured, one-on-one interviews were conducted in person 
with two exceptions.
6
  Twenty-two inspectors from the 
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
7
 (DEQ) and 
12 inspectors from the Ohio Environmental Protection 
Agency
8
 (OEPA) were interviewed.  Voluntary 
participation from inspectors in both agencies was sought, 
although the procedures vary slightly based on access 
                                                 
5 O‟Leary and Yandle (2000) report the Lester Environmental Protection 
Grades for 50 states which are compiled based on a state‟s commitment to 
environmental quality and its institutional capacity for environmental 
management.  Both Virginia and Ohio received a “C” rating and the majority of 
states (30) fell in the range of either a “B” or “C.”  These grades were based on 
states‟ commitment to environmental quality and their institutional capacity for 
environmental management. 
6 All but two of the 34 interviews were conducted in person; two interviews 
with DEQ inspectors were conducted via phone at the request of the inspectors 
for logistical reasons.  Moreover, the interviews were not recorded because 
pilot interviews revealed a nervousness of inspectors to be candid in their 
responses.  This proved to be the correct decision for these interviews because a 
number of interviewees remarked “since you‟re not recording this, I‟ll tell you 
about…”, for example. 
7 The 22 DEQ inspectors represent all seven regions of Virginia (Northern 
Virginia, Piedmont, South Central, Southwest, Tidewater, West Central, and 
Valley).  The interviews were conducted in Summer 2007. 
8 The 12 OEPA inspectors were from the southwest regional office.  The 
interviews were conducted Summer 2009. 
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directives given.
9
  The 22 inspectors interviewed from 
DEQ represent approximately 13 percent of the inspectors 
in DEQ.
10
  The inspectors from OEPA are all based in the 
Southwest District Office located in Dayton and they 
represent approximately 10 percent of the entire district 
staff.
11
  Accordingly, although 34 inspectors constitute a 
sizable group to conduct one-on-one interviews with, these 
inspectors represent a small percentage of both states‟ 
inspector populations.  As such, it is important to recognize 
the limits of generalizablility that are possible from this 
study‟s findings.12  Despite these limitations, this 
exploratory research is important in calling attention to the 
accountability challenges environmental regulators may 
face, and more generally, attention to front-line actors in 
environmental policy. 
The 34 inspectors comprise a relatively diverse 
group of individuals.  As might be expected with 
                                                 
9 To gain access to DEQ, the regional supervisor for each media in all seven 
regions was contacted and based upon the responses of each of the 21 
supervisors, I sought interviews with inspectors across regions and 
environmental media.  Some supervisors sent me the names and contact 
information for inspectors I could speak with while other supervisors said I 
could contact whomever and still other supervisors ignored repeated inquiries.  
Naturally selection bias becomes a concern since I was not able to draw a 
random sample of inspectors, but given the necessity of gaining agency 
permission and access, I had to seek interviews in accordance with agency 
directions. 
10 The figure of 13 percent is based on the total number of inspectors budgeted 
for in the agency, not the current number of filled inspector positions. 
11 To gain access to the OEPA, several meetings were held with the leadership 
of the regional office and it was decided that I would directly approach the 
region‟s staff at one of their regularly scheduled staff meetings.  At the 
meeting, I made brief remarks about the nature of the research and what type of 
involvement I was seeking from the front-line regulators.  Afterwards, I invited 
regulators to sign-up to be contacted for an interview and interviews were 
secured with all OEPA staff that expressed an interest in being interviewed. 
12 Nonresponse bias of course is a concern, however, neither agency was able 
to provide me background data on their regulators as a whole so that 
comparisons between the interview sample and the larger population could be 
made.  The inability to explore the nonresponse bias is not ideal, however, this 
research is exploratory and makes limited generalizability claims.  
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environmental professionals, 76 percent of the inspectors 
interviewed were male.
13
  The average inspector has been 
in his/her job for more than 10 years.  All three major 
environmental media (air, water, and waste) were 
represented in the sample:  13 air inspectors
14
, 13 water 
inspectors, and eight waste inspectors were interviewed.   
 
Essential Elements of Interactions 
 Accountability concerns stem from inspectors‟ 
routine interactions with members of the regulated 
community.  These interviews probe inspectors for what 
they want in these interactions so we can gain insights into 
what the front-line regulators desire in their regulatory 
interactions; and, therefore, might allow us to deduce what 
forms of accountability they prefer.  Inspectors were asked 
what makes for good interactions with members of the 
regulated community and these essential elements are 
found in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
13 It is not surprising to find a significant majority of regulators were male 
considering the dominance of the environmental sciences fields by men for 
quite some time. 
14 No air inspectors from OEPA were interviewed because although there is a 
division of air pollution in OEPA, most of the compliance and enforcement 
oversight with air regulations in the SWDO is relegated to local entities that are 
responsible for such measures, such as the Regional Air Pollution Control 
Agency (RAPCA). 
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Table 1 
Essential Elements of Interactions with Regulated 
Community (N=34) 
Element
15
 Percentage (N)
16
 
Cooperation/Positive Attitude to Work 
Together 
53 percent (18) 
Communication and Responsiveness 41 percent (14) 
Build rapport, relationships 38 percent (13) 
Knowledgeable  32 percent (11) 
Understand the other side, perspective 26 percent (9) 
Explain purpose, help 24 percent (8) 
Openness/Honesty 21 percent (7) 
Respect 18 percent (6) 
 
Although there are several striking observations 
from these findings, the dominant theme inspectors report 
they want in their interactions is a good working 
relationship with the regulated community.  Cooperation 
and communication are the most common elements that 
inspectors want in their interactions.  One may infer that 
relationships where both sides cooperate, communicate, 
understand each other, and are open require a significant 
degree of flexibility and discretion on the part of the 
inspectors to foster.  It is fascinating to note that inspectors 
did not emphasize that good interactions with the regulated 
community are characterized by the regulated community 
using the “correct” pollution abatement technology.  Rather 
inspectors seem to indicate that the cooperative interactions 
are most important.   
                                                 
15 Inspectors were asked what are the essential elements for positive 
interactions with the regulated community; they were not asked for a 
predetermined number, simply whatever came to mind. 
16 The percentage indicates the percent of inspectors who offered each essential 
element and the actual number of inspectors is in parentheses.  Therefore, 53 
percent or 18 inspectors said cooperation was an essential element.  An 
inspector may have offered cooperation, communication, and respect as 
essential elements.   
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These findings seem to align with the attributes of 
professional accountability previously discussed.  
Inspectors want to exercise professional judgment to work 
together with the regulated community and help them 
achieve compliance with environmental regulations.  
Inspectors frequently report that the best outcomes result 
when the two sides work together to solve a problem.  
Working together requires that inspectors have the 
flexibility and discretion that comes with professional 
judgment.  Being forced to follow set procedures – 
indicative of bureaucratic accountability – could limit 
relationship building efforts.    
The genesis for many of these essential elements 
undoubtedly comes from the varied experiences of the 
inspectors.  These experiences are illustrated through 
several stories.
17
  One air inspector at DEQ conveyed his 
experiences with a printing facility.  The inspector was at 
the facility conducting a routine inspection and noted that 
the rag buckets were uncovered – a permit violation.  The 
facility personnel accompanying the inspector on his 
inspection were encouraged to remedy the problem so they 
would not face a penalty.  However, the facility official did 
not take the opportunity to do so.  This experience shows 
inspectors desiring facility personnel to be cooperative and 
be receptive to open communications.  A water inspector 
noted that showing an interest in a facility, beyond the 
inspector‟s reasons for being there, goes a long way in 
building a relationship with the facility personnel.  This 
inspector was visiting a poultry processing plant and 
eagerly took the facility tour, complete with a trip to the 
                                                 
17 It is worth noting that when interviewees were asked to convey stories about 
positive experiences with the regulated community, inspectors frequently 
remarked that there were so many good stories, it was difficult to pick one or 
two to talk about.  Inspectors were asked to relay stories to help exemplify what 
they thought were essential elements in their interactions with the regulated 
community. 
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“kill floor.”  At the close of the visit, the inspector was 
surprised to observe how pleased the facility official was 
that the inspector took a genuine interest in the facility‟s 
operation and the facility official had an opportunity to put 
his company‟s work on display.  Another air inspector was 
working with a paper and cardboard manufacturer that 
needed to switch to a fuel that contained a higher sulfur 
content for production purposes.  The facility official was 
unsure what permit modifications might be needed, so the 
official contacted the inspector so that they could work 
together to figure out what steps the facility needed to take 
to switch fuels.  A similar story is conveyed by an OEPA 
water inspector who was dealing with a facility that 
exceeded its cooper limits.  The facility official wanted to 
cooperate with OEPA and was open enough to answer 
questions and work with the inspector to figure out that the 
extra cooper was coming from mop water being dumped 
down the drain, not industrial processes.  It could be argued 
that these experiences demonstrate that positive 
relationships lead to better environmental outcomes for the 
public because compliance can be achieved more quickly 
rather than every issue resorting to an acrimonious fight 
over which side is correct. 
 
Challenges and Obstacles in Interactions 
It is equally important to consider what inspectors 
find most challenging in their interactions with the 
regulated community and what they would most like to see 
changed.  Understanding the challenges inspectors face 
might provide insights into the procedures and other control 
mechanisms that they find frustrating and these obstacles 
may illuminate any undesirable aspects of accountability.  
Each inspector was asked what are the biggest challenges 
or obstacles in interacting with the regulated community 
and the results are reported in Table 2. 
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Table 2. 
Challenges/Obstacles in Interactions with Regulated 
Community (N=33)
18
 
Challenge/Obstacle
19
 Percentage (N)
20
 
Complexity of regulations 45 percent (15) 
Burdensome paperwork and procedures 33 percent (11) 
CEDS (internal DEQ database) 21 percent (7) 
Negative perceptions of government 21 percent (7) 
Inspector issues (e.g. low morale, entry 
level position) 
21 percent (7) 
Need for more flexibility/discretion 18 percent (6) 
  
These findings may not be surprising given that 
they echo many common complaints of front-line workers 
(c.f. Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).  
The most common challenge inspectors reported was trying 
to contend with the complexity of the regulations.  
Inspectors expressed frustration at the complexities of both 
federal and state regulations that often render them 
incomprehensible even to the inspectors tasked with 
enforcing them.  One air inspector noted that the confusion 
the regulations cause frustrates not only the inspectors, but 
the facility personnel too.  Often frustration levels grow 
over the regulations which can impede the interaction of 
inspectors and facility personnel.  Adding to these issues, 
an OEPA waste inspector lamented that waste regulations 
have to be revised every five years and the almost constant 
revision leaves regulators and the regulated community 
struggling to keep up with changes.  He would rather see 
                                                 
18
 There is missing data for one inspector interview. 
19 Interviewees were asked:  what are the biggest challenges you face in 
interacting with the regulated community.  The question was open-ended and 
responses were organized after the interviews were completed.  Interviewees 
were not asked for a predetermined number of challenges. 
20 Number of interviewees who stated a particular challenge, both raw number 
and percentage of total interviewees.  The percentages reflect the frequency; 
therefore, they do not add to 100 percent. 
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the regulations “reexamined” instead of “rewritten” 
because, after all, “if it‟s not broke, don‟t fix [it].”  
Complex statutes are a traditional way legislatures 
endeavor to control bureaucracies and stem fears of 
regulatory capture.  Moreover, confusing regulations 
written by a regulatory agency are often a means to 
demonstrate accountability to their oversight bodies. 
Besides complaints about the regulations 
themselves, most of the other reported challenges have to 
deal with issues related to bureaucratic accountability.  
Inspectors complain about paperwork that keeps them in 
the office and tied to the computer checking off boxes in 
databases; inspectors at DEQ frequently criticized the 
agency‟s internal database (Comprehensive Environmental 
Data System or CEDS) and lamented that it was one of the 
most frustrating aspects of their jobs.  An air inspector 
reported that he became so frustrated with CEDS that he 
developed his own tracking spreadsheet to keep up with his 
facilities; his supervisor liked the inspector‟s own 
spreadsheet so much more than CEDS that he asked the 
inspector for a copy of the file so he could use it too.  An 
OEPA water inspector said his biggest aggravation is the 
procedures he and the regulated community have to follow 
that makes the system inflexible; he would prefer a “more 
nimble” system to better accomplish environmental goals.  
Another OEPA water inspector reported that that the 
system is turning “into a paper program” where compliance 
boils down to pushing paper instead of having a 
“meaningful” environmental protection system. 
Additionally, a handful of inspectors indicated that 
they simply needed more flexibility and discretion to do 
their jobs.  This finding is intriguing as it lends support to 
Sparrow (2000), Bardach and Kagan (1982/2002), and 
others, who note that regulators need more flexibility and 
discretion in their work to help produce the desired 
regulatory outcomes. 
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 Perhaps these challenges are best summed up by an 
air inspector in Virginia who reported that the way 
environmental enforcement works is essentially 
“compliance by computer.”  In other words, databases 
designed to ensure permit conditions are met have become 
the de facto mechanisms for determining environmental 
performance by simply checking off boxes, such as did the 
facility turn in their report on time.  The same inspector 
said it is vital for inspectors to “get out as often” as possible 
because that is where environmental compliance is truly 
determined.  This inspector, along with his colleagues, 
routinely indicated that although checklists can be useful at 
times, they do not ensure environmental protection.  Being 
in the field at a facility, observing the facility‟s operations, 
and interacting with the individuals at the facility is the best 
means of ensuring the health of the environment, according 
to this inspector.   
 One may conclude that the challenges inspectors 
report are more closely aligned with bureaucratic 
accountability.  Inspectors in this study are frustrated over 
complexity of regulations that dictate how they are 
supposed to do almost everything, paperwork and other 
“bureaucratic” procedures, and even an agency database.  It 
is reasonable to surmise that these procedures are in place 
to maintain bureaucratic accountability, yet these are the 
sources of greatest frustration to inspectors in their work 
interacting with the regulated community because it 
constrains their actions of seeking desired environmental 
outcomes for the public.  This is not to say that inspectors 
do not understand why these circumstances exist, but they 
are frustrating nonetheless and inspectors would like them 
to change.  Inspectors in this study do not report 
frustrations with the freedom or discretion they have in 
their interactions, by contrast. 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The 34 inspectors in this study express numerous 
frustrations in interacting with the regulated community.  
These complaints, including burdensome paperwork that 
keeps them in the office, internal databases, and an outright 
desire for more flexibility, lend support to existing research 
that regulators face bureaucratic accountability controls 
(c.f. May 2007).  Yet these inspectors indicate that they 
want positive working relationships with members of the 
regulated community.  More specifically, they strive to 
build relationships with their counterparts, they want open 
and honest communication, and they want to help them 
achieve and maintain compliance.  Positive relationships 
are more efficient in ensuring environmental outcomes 
compared to adversarial ones (Pautz 2009).  Regardless of 
the types of accountability mechanisms in place, however, 
there must be some form of accountability for inspectors to 
guard against regulatory capture and ensure the public 
interest is being served.   To achieve these types of 
interactions, it may be argued that inspectors need a 
decreased emphasis on bureaucratic accountability in favor 
of professional accountability controls.    
It is unsurprising that inspectors complain of 
bureaucratic accountability controls for several reasons.  
First, performance measures – which are intertwined in 
accountability conversations – of state environmental 
agencies clearly emphasize output measurements 
(Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003, 181-187; Gormley 
2000).  Output measures related to environmental 
inspectors include the number of inspections conducted, the 
number of enforcement actions taken, the amounts of fines 
recovered, and response rates to the regulated community 
(e.g. turnaround time on report submission).  By contrast, 
outcome measures might include the number of tons of a 
pollutant prevented from escaping into the atmosphere or 
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the increase in energy efficiency from one quarter to 
another.  “Still most states continue to rely more on 
“output” measures (such as the number of inspections 
conducted) rather than “outcome” measures (such as 
changes in air or water quality), despite the latter‟s greater 
importance.” (Gormley and Balla 2004, 121).  Part of this 
reliance stems from the rigid oversight requirements state 
environmental agencies face from U.S. EPA (c.f. Scheberle 
2004; Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003; Lowry 1992).  
“EPA has traditionally evaluated enforcement programs 
primarily by measuring agency activities or outputs – what 
has been referred to derisively as a “bean counting” 
approach…These traditional indicies have been relied on 
because they are relatively easy to measure and report …” 
(Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003, 66).  A focus on outputs 
is vastly more common than outcome measures, such as 
environmental benefits and rates of noncompliance, in state 
agencies for a host of reasons (Rechtschaffen and Markell 
2003; Gormley 2000).  Output data is relatively easy to 
tabulate and continues to be modus operandi for U.S. 
EPA‟s state reporting requirements (Rechtschaffen and 
Markell 2003).   
In the cases of both Virginia and Ohio, a perusal of 
each agency‟s website communicates an emphasis on 
output data.  For example, readily available on DEQ‟s 
website are reports to the Virginia General Assembly.  The 
2009 Report on Air Quality conveys raw data about the 
number of inspections completed (2,601), the number of 
stack tests observed (77), and the number of enforcement 
actions (483) (Virginia DEQ 2009).  OEPA‟s readily 
available 2009 Annual Report also presents similar 
performance measurement data.  After detailing the number 
of hazardous waste facilities inspected (551) and the 
number of citizens‟ complaints investigated (331), the 
Division of Hazardous Waste issued enforcement orders 
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that assed $701,575 in penalties (OEPA Annual Report 
2009, 6).   
Additionally, outcome data is far more difficult to 
compute technically speaking and is often wrought with 
debate if figures are actually calculated (Rechtschaffen and 
Markell 2003, Gormley 2000).  For instance, calculating 
the number of tons of a pollutant that did not reach the 
atmosphere is far more complex than calculating how many 
times an inspector visited a particular facility.  Moreover, 
both states and U.S. EPA seem to resist any more than 
token efforts to embrace outcome measurements 
(Rechtschaffen and Markell 2003, 296-307).  Continued 
reliance on output measures only further entrenches an 
emphasis on bureaucratic accountability from the 
inspectors‟ perspective. 
 Second, these findings are unsurprising in light of 
existing literature on front-line workers more generally and 
environmental inspectors more explicitly.  The motivations 
for more flexibility and discretion to build relationships 
may come from the inspectors‟ need to develop coping 
strategies because of the “impossible” nature of their jobs 
(Lipsky 1980; Fineman 1998).  Front-line workers in a 
variety of contexts are routinely overburdened and develop 
methods of better dealing with the demands they face.  
Regulators may believe that the best way to deal with 
enormous facility loads is to have positive working 
relationships with facility officials.  Or the motivations may 
stem from an earnest desire to work with the regulated 
community to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes, as 
the broader regulatory enforcement literature would 
substantiate (c.f. Hutter 1989; Bardach and Kagan 
1982/2002; Hutter 1997; May and Burby 1998, Pautz 
2009).  These adverse reactions to the rigidity and 
complexity that inspectors face in their day-to-day 
responsibilities are to be expected.   
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MOVEMENT TOWARD PROFESSIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 Although bureaucratic accountability controls are 
expected in the work of environmental regulators that does 
not indicate that they are the best means of ensuring 
accountability.  Despite the inevitable resistance likely to 
accompany a shift in controls, the front-line regulators 
interviewed here provide some initial support for a move 
beyond bureaucratic accountability toward professional 
accountability, or at the very least, some combination of 
these two means of control.  As previously discussed, the 
regulatory literature also appears to support movement 
toward professional accountability (c.f. May 2007; Sparrow 
2000).  The rationale for a movement toward professional 
accountability and away from bureaucratic accountability is 
manifold.  Such a shift does not mean that abandoning 
bureaucratic accountability controls is the aim; rather, 
given the findings from the inspector interviews reported 
here contextualized in the broader discussions of the 
environmental regulatory state, movement towards 
professional accountability controls might be appropriate. 
 First, we should listen to the front-line regulators 
and their experiences on the ground to help inform 
decisions about the regulatory state.  As previously noted, 
those individuals on the front-lines are routinely ignored 
and their experiences discounted even though they are the 
ones frequently in the best position to assess policy 
implementation and recommend modifications (c.f. 
Hummel 1991; Schmidt 1993; Pautz and Schnitzer 2008).  
Specifically related to environmental policy, inspectors are 
likely to have much needed assessments of the regulated 
community, their intentions, their struggles, and what 
changes may be needed.  The inspectors interviewed here 
report that they frequently feel bound to their offices and 
constrained by complex regulations and burdensome 
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procedures that get in the way of building relationships 
with the regulated community.  Numerous questions and 
directions for future study – both empirical and normative – 
arise.  First, do we want front-line regulators in the office 
ensuring environmental protection or would we rather they 
be in the field working with the regulated community to 
achieve environmental protection?  Turnaround time on an 
inspection report hardly indicates environmental protection, 
yet that is one of the measures we use to assess 
environmental performance and ensure accountability.  It 
would seem that assessing environmental protection is 
more easily accomplished outside of the office; however, 
paperwork, along with other reporting requirements, is a 
significant portion of many environmental regulations.  
Moreover, if inspectors build relationships with the 
regulated community, how can we guard against regulatory 
capture to ensure the public‟s interests are being served?  
Although the research presented here offers no ready 
answers to these important questions, thoughtful study and 
discussion of these issues must occur as environmental 
regulation continues to evolve.  
 Second, environmental policy in the U.S. is 
beginning to undergo a shift away from traditional 
command and control regulation, or first generation 
policies
21
, toward more flexible and innovative next 
generation policies that coincide well with professional 
accountability and increased reliance on front-line 
regulators (c.f. Eisner 2006; Fiorino 2006; Durant, Fiorino, 
and O‟Leary 2004; Sparrow 2000; Wilbanks and Stern 
2002).  Throughout the history of environmental regulation 
in the U.S., one particular regulatory approach has 
                                                 
21 The term “first-generation” environmental policies may indicate that such 
policies are obsolete when that is not the intended meaning.  Instead, this 
common term refers to the initial, dominant approach to environmental policy 
and many of its characteristics may indeed be appropriate for current 
environmental policy. 
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dominated the policy arena – command and control 
regulation.  It is this strategy that has become synonymous 
with the phrase “first generation environmental policies.”  
Command and control implies a top-down model that is 
heavily centralized (Hoffman et. al 2002, 821; Kraft 2001, 
202-203).  Most of the major environmental legislation in 
the U.S. is based on command and control regulation and 
these statutes have resulted in dramatic improvements in 
the health and overall condition of the environment (c.f. 
Davies and Mazurek 1997; Andrews 1999; Kraft 2007).  
Significant reductions in major air pollutants have been 
realized, and many harmful pollutants have been all but 
eliminated (e.g. lead, CFCs).   
 Because of the specificity of these regulations, 
regulators are given the relatively straightforward task of 
overseeing compliance with the regulations.  Inspectors 
have to determine if a certain emissions level is being met 
or if a particular type of abatement technology is employed.  
If an inspector finds a compliance problem, there are 
prescribed enforcement proceedings to follow.  Although 
there is opportunity for some discretion on the part of an 
inspector, the standards and consequences if they are not 
met are defined with the aim of minimizing the opportunity 
for regulatory capture.  These efforts to stem the threat of 
capture encourage inspectors to “go by the book” and adopt 
a regulatory approach that is closer to the deterrence end of 
the spectrum rather than a more accommodative approach – 
at least in theory (Bardach and Kagan 1982/2002).  As 
King (2006) and Fiorino (2006) note, this environment 
ultimately results in adversarial relations between 
regulators and the regulated community. 
Yet, the well-intentioned command and control 
regulations and their successes are not without their 
criticisms.  Fiorino (2006) outlines five key limitations of 
command and control regulation.  First, these regulations 
impede innovation because they prescribe specific 
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environmental goals and processes to achieve these goals; 
there is little incentive to go beyond compliance with the 
regulations.  Second, command and control regulations are 
inflexible, legalistic, and fragmented.  Regulated 
companies have few, if any, incentives to try new methods 
of reducing their pollution levels because of a regulatory 
system built around rules that, if violated, will send a 
company to court faced with an assortment of charges and 
fines.  A third limitation is that command and control 
regulations can be expensive.  Specific technologies can be 
expensive, as can adopting particular production processes 
and recordkeeping.  Fourth, command and control 
regulation is becoming increasingly irrelevant to many 
environmental problems and is therefore ineffective.  The 
nature of environmental problems has changed dramatically 
in the last 30 plus years.  Initially, the aim was simply to 
contain waste and other pollutants; now the focus is 
shifting to preventing pollution before it happens (Fiorino 
2006, 81).   
Finally, command and control regulations are 
challenging to implement – and not just for the regulated 
community.  One of the underlying assumptions of 
command and control regulation was that government 
“knew it all” and could dictate environmental standards and 
means of achieving those standards; that has proven far 
from the case.  Technology changes rapidly as do 
environmental challenges, and the time that it takes to pass 
legislation and promulgate regulations often cannot keep up 
with those changes.  Such criticisms of first generation 
policies are widely noted and adoption of alternative 
strategies is frequently advocated (c.f. NAPA 1997; Davies 
and Mazurek 1997; Rondinelli 2001; Kettl 2002a,b; 
Durant, O‟Leary and Fiorino 2004; Eisner 2006; Fiorino 
2006).   
Next-generation environmental policy refers to 
assorted policy tools that move beyond traditional 
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command and control techniques.  Compared to command 
and control, next-generation environmental policies are 
cooperative not confrontational, comprehensive rather than 
fragmented, and flexible instead of rigid (Chertow and Esty 
1997, 4).  Since discussion of alternative policy tools is 
relatively new in environmental policy literature, much of it 
focuses on very specific examples of next-generation 
environmental policies instead of a general examination of 
these alternatives (c.f. Hockenstein, Stavins, and Whithead 
1997; Stavins and Whitehead 1997; NAPA 1997; Wilbanks 
and Stern 2002).   
 Accordingly, continued movement towards these 
next-generation environmental policies will require 
increased discretion and flexibility for front-line regulators, 
and therefore professional accountability controls.  And the 
greater flexibility afforded the regulated community in how 
they achieve prescribed environmental goals might 
diminish the role of more traditional, bureaucratic means of 
ensuring accountability, such as routine emissions 
monitoring data reports.
22
  Undoubtedly, though, 
movement towards professional accountability will face 
much resistance, but that is an insufficient reason to retain 
the traditional way of ensuring accountability. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 While these factors may explain why bureaucratic 
accountability dominates the work of environmental 
inspectors, this is not an adequate explanation for the 
continued pursuit of these measures, particularly when 
other means of accountability might be better aligned with 
                                                 
22 An argument could be made that bureaucratic accountability mechanisms 
need to remain in place to avoid agency capture and ensure regulators are not 
co-opted by the individuals they are trying to regulate; nevertheless, the topic 
leaves much room for debate (see Pautz 2010 for a more thorough discussion of 
next-generation policies and the implications for inspectors). 
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environmental protection objectives.  Accountability is 
important and appropriate mechanisms must be in place to 
guard against capture and ensure service to the public, but 
an overreliance on bureaucratic accountability mechanisms 
can leave inspectors frustrated that protecting the health of 
the environment boils down to “compliance by computer.”  
Without abandoning output measures and some traditional, 
bureaucratic means of ensuring accountability, professional 
accountability mechanisms could be advantageous for two 
reasons.  First, professional accountability recognizes the 
significance of inspectors and their work and acknowledges 
the important role they play in protecting our environment.  
Professional accountability acknowledges the expertise of 
these front-line civil servants and appreciates their 
contributions and the importance of their work.  Second, as 
we move toward next-generation environmental policies, 
bureaucratic accountability is increasingly difficult with 
policies that are more flexible and more reliant on 
outcomes.  Therefore, as the policies evolve, so must 
accountability. 
 This exploratory research calls attention to a 
neglected area of study in environmental policy literature, 
regulatory literature, and accountability literature and there 
is much work that remains.  A more comprehensive study 
of inspectors is needed, both in environmental policy and in 
other regulatory contexts.  Larger samples with a more 
exhaustive set of questions would enable a more 
comprehensive study of accountability perceptions and 
preferences among regulators.  Additionally, further study 
is needed of the different levels of government both 
domestically and internationally.  Once a firmer foundation 
is established through interviews, other methodologies, 
such as survey research, could be employed to allow for 
greater generalizability claims. 
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 Front-line workers – environmental inspectors in 
this case – are routinely overlooked.23  Policy is made at the 
highest levels and dictated to the rest of the agency.  Yet, 
front-line workers are responsible for the implementation 
of that policy and therefore its success or failure.  It is 
important to recognize and appreciate their roles and 
consider their views on their work to better ensure policy 
implementation and outcomes.   
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